Our twenty-first century is a time of turbulence. Some of that turbulence is derived from not fully understanding what makes us moral. Th is article reassesses human morality in order to identify what nurtures and what distorts our moral nature. Such a reassessment potentially off ers hope for a way through the escalating violence in our world that currently threatens to destroy us.
INTRODUCTION
Our twenty-first century is a time of turbulence. Some of that turbulence is derived from not fully understanding what makes us moral. Th is article reassesses human morality in order to identify what nurtures and what distorts our moral nature. Such a reassessment potentially off ers hope for a way through the escalating violence in our world that currently threatens to destroy us.
Th is article focuses on three voices: the voice of anthropological philosopher René Girard, whose mimetic theory calls us to wake up about our role in creating violence; the voice of medieval scholastic John Duns Scotus, whose moral theory is enjoying a renaissance in our contemporary world; and the voice of neuroscience with its unfolding knowledge about how human neurophysiology mediates our actions and our morality. Central to all three messages is the concept of empathy.
Th e term "empathy" is only about a hundred years old. 1 It is defined by Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary as the action of and the capacity for "understanding, being aware of, being sensitive to, and vicariously experiencing the feelings, thoughts, and experience of another" without having them "communicated in an objectively explicit manner. "
According to the neuroscientific discipline of behavioral science, empathy is a key element of our human social nature and an essential prerequisite for our moral development. 2 For Girard, empathy can pull us into mimesis-a nonconscious imitation of others-and violent reciprocity with each other. Empathy can also allow us to identify with the other in a process of renouncing our own violence. 3 For Scotus, the word empathy did not exist. Yet, the lodestone for Scotus's view of morality is empathy-a desire for the good in itself of things. Th e centrality of empathy plus the moral significance of freedom of the human will mark a distinct advance in Scotus's thinking over that of his predecessors. 4 Th e purpose of this article is to show how the three voices from divergent disciplines are conveying one message to audiences today: the importance of mimesis for human morality. Th is message leads to greater clarity and explanatory depth about human morality.
THE VOICE OF RENÉ GIRARD

Girard's Mimetic Theory 5
Mimetic theory emphasizes the role of imitation in our lives. Imitation is a way in which we learn in life-a way in which we learn language and acquire culture. 6 According to Girard, imitation also generates human conflict in the form of competition, rivalry, and violence.
How does imitation generate conflict?
If our desire to be like a model is strong enough, if we identify with that person closely enough, we will want to have what the model has or be what the model is. If this is carried far enough and if there are no safeguards braking our desire (one of the functions of religion and culture), then we become rivals of our models. Or we compete with one another to become bett er imitators of the same model, and we imitate our rivals even as we compete with them. 7 Th rough his eyes as a historian and a philosopher of social science, Girard understands the scapegoat mechanism 8 as a way to resolve the conflict that comes from mimetic rivalry. Rather than fighting with the other for what he has or is, rather than killing the other, human beings join mimetically with each other and blame an outsider, a scapegoat. When they unite against the scapegoat and sacrifice the victim, harmony is restored. In this way, maintains Girard, the public sacrifice of a scapegoat is the foundation of all archaic religions and civilizations. It is the formula for transforming the eff ects of mimetic rivalry into viable communities. Th e problem today, as Girard sees it, is that the ancient formula no longer has to work. He att ributes this to Christianity. A scapegoat only works as long as people believe in its guilt. Since the crucifixion of Jesus, the truth that the victim is innocent has been revealed. "By accepting crucifixion, Christ brought to light what had been 'hidden since the foundation of the world,' in other words, the foundation itself, the unanimous murder that appeared in broad daylight for the first time on the cross. " 9 Paradoxically, the Passion freed not only violence but also holiness. In Girard's words:
Th e fett ers put in place by the founding murder but unshackled by the Passion, are now librating planet-wide violence, and we cannot refasten the bindings because we now know that scapegoats are innocent. Th e Passion unveiled the sacrificial origin of humanity once and for all. It dismantled the sacred and revealed its violence. 10 Freed of sacrificial constraints, the human mind invented science, technology and all the best and worst of culture. Our civilization is the most creative and powerful ever known, but also the most fragile and threatened because it no longer has the safety rails of archaic religion. Without sacrifice in the broad sense, it could destroy itself if it does not take care, which clearly it is not doing. 11 Girard goes on to comment on the violent times we currently live in. Terrorism, he believes, takes us beyond war in which people kill to save their country. Now people kill themselves to kill others. Girard proposes that the only way out of our apocalyptic times is to see that violence destroys and to renounce our own violence. "To make the Revelation wholly good, and not threatening at all, humans have only to adopt the behavior recommended by Christ: abstain completely from retaliation, and renounce the escalation to extremes. " 12 We can renounce our own violence by identifying with the scapegoat. "Mimesis is thus both the cause of the crisis and the means of resolving it. " 13 Recognizing the innocence of the scapegoat forces us to see our aggression that is fueled by mimetic energy. When we are caught up in mimesis, we don't see our aggression. Instead, we feel self-righteous. Our true nature is hidden from us. Identification makes it possible to stand outside mimesis and see how we are harming the other and ourselves.
THE VOICE OF JOHN DUNS SCOTUS
Introduction
Th e details of Scotus's life are obscure. According to C. R. S. Harris, who was the Jane Eliza Procter Visiting Fellow at Princeton University for 1922-23, "Never perhaps was there a writer in his time so illustrious, of whom we know so litt le, so elusive is he, so remotely impersonal. " 14 Although he lived a short life, Scotus lived at the time of an intellectual turning point for Western Europeans, marked by the arrival of Aristotle's Physics, Metaphysics, De Anima, and Nicomachean Ethics from Greece. Aristotle's writings brought a new way of explaining reality from a scientific perspective. Human fulfillment, according to Aristotle, was realized in intellectual transcendence. Scotus's view of morality was influenced by Aristotle's scientific explanation of reality. Essentially, Scotus's "teaching concerning the nature of morality and the classification of the virtues is merely a reconstruction of the Aristotelian ethics in the light of his [Scotus's] conception of the will. " 16 Aristotle had no conception of the will to explain the connection between knowledge and conduct.
Scotus's View of Morality
Right moral action, according to Scotus, results from the cooperation of two human faculties: the intellect, which is essentially cognition, and free will, which is in part aff ective motivation. Th e will, however, is not merely an aff ective response to what should be done. Scotus thinks the will is rational-noncontradictory and logically consistent-with two inclinations toward good: desire focused inward and desire focused outward. His vision of the person is holistic, centered on the will/desire as rational and the intellect/cognition as helper.
More explicitly, before the will can freely choose, it requires enlightenment by the intellect. But the intellect contains both perfect and imperfect cognitive activity. A perfect act of cognition has to do with an object existing here and now; an imperfect act of cognition has to do with a future event or a memory of the past. 17 By choosing one, the will confirms and intends that act.
A chosen act of the will is always free, but if it chooses an act, it must choose in accord with one of the will's two inclinations toward good: its aff ection for the advantageous and its aff ection for justice. Th e will's aff ection for the advantageous (aff ectio commodi) is human desire focused inward. It is an inclination for self-preservation, self-perfection, and happiness; it is "the disposition whereby the will is drawn to love goods that bring pleasure and enjoyment to the self. " 18 To quote Scotus's Ordinatio III, suppl., dist. 46, "Th e other act [of wanting something for oneself] pertains to the will inasmuch as it has an aff ection for the advantageous. " 19 Aff ectio commodi is perfected by hope.
Th e will's aff ection for justice (aff ectio iustitiae) is human desire focused outward. It is an inclination to love; it is the "disposition whereby the will is drawn to love the good because of its intrinsic value . . . and not because of any personal gain. " 20 In Scotus's words, "To love something in itself [or for its own sake] is more an act of giving or sharing and is a freer act than is desiring that object for oneself. As such it is an act more appropriate to the will, as the seat of this innate justice at least. " 21 Aff ectio iustitiae is perfected by charity.
According to Scotus, "Either it [the will] wills the good as an intrinsic value in itself [aff ectio iustitiae] or it seeks the good as something advantageous for self or nature [aff ectio commodi]. " 22 Furthermore, "if the will elicits an act in regard to good it is free only to love it or abstain from loving it, but not to hate it qua good. Similarly, in the presence of evil it is still free to hate or turn away from it or not, but it is not free to love it. " 23 Scotus uses Augustine's simile of the horse and the rider to clarify what he means. 24 Comparing the horse to the will and the rider to charity, the horse is free to throw its rider (destroy charity through mortal sin), or not to follow the guidance of the rider (commit indiff erent or venially sinful action), or to choose to follow where charity leads (act meritoriously). Th us, moral goodness is not something absolute; it is a relationship-of horse and rider, of will and charity. Goodness is the agreement of the act with right reason. It is free will/desire choosing with the help of the intellect/cognition.
In summary, Scotus's thinking-on the moral significance of the freedom of the will-stresses that the exercise of freedom is a necessary condition for any action to have a moral value. Being free to disregard the inclination for self-indulgence and to follow the dictates of right reason-in terms of the goal the action att ains, the eff ort expended, and the consequences of the action-a person can be praised or blamed, rewarded or punished for the results from the action. Freedom and responsibility go hand in hand. 25 Scotus goes on to describe those conditions that make the will's action good or bad. Morality "begins with the rational perception of goodness. " 26 Scotus refers to this as natural goodness. He reasons as follows: human beings see creation as good. Th is must be so because the creator is good and thus what flows from the creator's nature must also be good. 27 Here 28 Despite the obvious ambiguity in Scotus's portrayal of natural goodness, natural goodness seems to be this: doing good deeds because it is natural for human beings to do so. 29 Put another way, human beings have a natural inclination toward good. 30 Beyond natural goodness in general, Scotus delineates three degrees of moral goodness: generic moral goodness (where the act is appropriate in honoring God or in serving one's own or another's good-such as giving to the needy), specific circumstantial moral goodness (where the concrete circumstances are appropriate-such as giving to the needy at the right time and in an appropriate manner), and meritorious moral goodness, which refers to those acts motivated by love that merit a supernatural reward. 31 Moral goodness in any of its three degrees goes beyond natural goodness by implying the conformity of the act to the dictates of right reason. Th ere is a "harmonious interrelationship" 32 between the act and the reason. Love completes this relationship. "Love completes our actions in the creation of relationships with others and, especially, with God. " 33 Th e major foundation for moral living is not obligation or law alone but also love and relationship. Harris summarizes Scotus's definition of moral goodness:
Th us to be morally good an act must be perfect in its morality. It must be a free act elicited as the result of a moral choice, in accordance with the judgment of right reason, and on the responsibility of the individual's own deliberation. 34 A diagram of Scotus's view of morality might look like fi gure 1. Th e two components of the intellect deserve comment. Abstraction, for Scotus, refers to cognition, "the act by which the mind knows reality [the meaning of an object] via sense perception. " 35 It is what can be abstracted from sense 
FIGURE 1. SCHEMATIC: SCOTUS
encounters. In other words, it is knowledge based on comparing what is sensed with previously sensed or described images. 36 Abstraction is the perceptual counterpart of intuitive cognition. 37 Intuition 38 is also cognition; it "is certain knowledge" of reality [that an object exists]. 39 Scotus describes intuitive cognition as a form of simple [nonjudgmental] awareness of an object as existing. It is the mind in direct contact with what is known. 40 It is direct connection with the truth. Intuition is "certain knowledge of a present and existing object or person in its existence, unmediated by images or mental pictures. " 41 Scotus summarizes his conceptualization of the intellect in Lectura II, d. 3, nn. 285, 287-88:
Know that an intellect is capable of two sorts of knowledge and intellection, for it can have one that abstracts from all existence, and another of a thing present in its own existence. . . . Th e first sort of knowledge, according to which the intellect abstracts from all existence, is called "abstractive," whereas the other, according to which the intellect sees the thing in its existence, is called "intuitive. " It is not called "intuitive" because it is not "discursive," however, but rather because it is distinguished from that abstractive knowledge, which knows a thing in itself through a species. 42 As will become clear in the next section of this article, neuroscientists, according to Jonathan Haidt and Fredrik Bjorklund, hold a similar understanding:
We arrive at moral judgments by intuition, which is a kind of thinking that is not reasoning, and in which emotion oft en plays a role. 43 In summary, the words "mimesis" and "empathy" did not exist in Scotus's time, but his thinking describes both. His thinking informs the contemporary perspectives of Girard and neuroscience by delineating the diff erent aspects of our individual selves and how they can work in harmony (not to be confused with Cartesian autonomous eff orts) in order for us to bring a compassionate moral stance into our intersubjective experiences of empathy and mimesis. Both intrasubjective harmony and intersubjective harmony are required for the morality of intersubjectivity that is described later and that our twenty-first century so desperately needs.
THE VOICE OF NEUROSCIENCE
Introduction
Neurologists Allan Siegel and Hreday Sapru define neuroscience as A composite of several disciplines including neuroanatomy, neurophysiology, neurology, neuropathology, neuropharmacology, behavioral sciences, and cell biology. 44 Th e voice of neuroscience presented here is limited to three of these disciplines: neuroanatomy, neurophysiology, and behavioral sciences.
Neuroanatomy
Until recently, the rational left hemisphere of our brain-with its explicit, analytical, conscious, and verbal capacities-was considered our dominant brain. Currently, the pendulum is swinging. Science is revealing that our right hemisphere-with its implicit, integrative, unconscious, nonverbal, and bodilybased emotional knowing-may be equally important. 45 Th e right hemisphere, which undergoes rapid growth in the first 18 months of human life, is structurally integrated. Structural integration means that the neural networks of the right cortex (imagery) have direct connections to the neural networks of the limbic system (motivation and emotion) and to the neural networks of the brainstem (regulation of autonomic function and arousal). Aft er simultaneously and nonconsciously processing stimuli through all the integrated levels of neuronal connections, the right hemisphere communicates with the left through the corpus callosum. Th e left hemisphere undergoes rapid growth in the second year of life when language is acquired. Th e neural processes of the left hemisphere then perform a slower semantic analysis and synthesis of information. 46 So diff erent are the neural processes of the left and right hemispheres that scientists consider them not only two halves of one brain, but also two separate cortical-subcortical systems, each with unique functions. Th e functions of the left brain neural networks include the following: language, sequential slow analysis and synthesis, 47 and explicit conscious mindfulness. Th e functions of the right brain neural networks include imagery, nonverbal simultaneous analysis of stimuli, 48 implicit nonconscious mindfulness, 49 and aff ective empathy. 50 Human att achment patt erns, 51 intersubjectivity, 52 and intuition 53 also depend on the right hemisphere's resources. Intuition associated with the right brain neural networks is a direct visceral knowing, similar to what Scotus calls cognitive knowing, that is, the mind in direct contact with what is known.
Neurophysiology
Stephen W. Porges, PhD, Director, Brain-Body Center, Department of Psychiatry, University of Illinois at Chicago, off ers the Polyvagal Th eory for understanding the underlying physiological substrates necessary for the expression of morality. To the extent that morality involves understanding the impact of our actions on others, it involves social communication. According to Porges, social communication is determined by the cortical regulation of medullary nuclei by way of the corticobulbar pathways:
Th e social engagement system consists of a somatomotor component (i.e., special visceral eff erent pathways that regulate the striated muscles of the face and head) and a visceromotor component (i.e., the myelinated vagus that regulates the heart and bronchi). 54 When a person or situation is perceived as life threatening-a rapid, unconscious assessment mediated by brain neural networks in the right hemispherethis perception activates the unmyelinated vagus (dorsal vagal complex) producing immobilization (death feigning, passive avoidance, behavioral shutdown). When a person or situation is perceived as dangerous, activation of the sympathetic-adrenal system (sympathetic nervous system) produces mobilization (fight/flight, active avoidance). 55 Th ese two neural circuits activate neurophysiological states of fear and defensive behaviors that are incompatible with compassionate social communication and visceral homeostasis. 56 When a person or situation is perceived as safe, the myelinated vagus (ventral vagal complex) regulates the body to promote growth, restoration, and visceral homeostasis. 57 Th rough vagal motor pathways on the cardiac pacemaker, the heart rate slows, the fight/flight mechanisms of the sympathetic nervous system are inhibited, the stress response system of the hypothalamic-pituitaryadrenal axis (HPA-axis, e.g., cortisol) is dampened, and immune reactions (e.g., cytokines) are modulated. Th is neural circuit activates a neurophysiological state that encourages social engagement. Porges calls this neurophysiological state a state of calm or security in contrast to the state of fear produced by the dorsal vagal complex and the sympathetic nervous system. Furthermore, the brain stem nuclei that regulate the myelinated vagus are integrated with the nuclei that regulate the muscles of the face and head. "Specifically, the visceral states that promote growth and restoration are linked neuroanatomically and neurophysiologically with the muscles that regulate components of the eye gaze, facial expression, listening, and prosody. " 58 Th is involves cranial nerves V, VII, IX, X, and XI.
Neuroendocrine correlates of the social engagement system include oxytocin and vasopressin. 59 Both peptides are synthesized in the hypothalamus, and both have been found throughout the limbic system and in the brainstem autonomic centers. 60 "Oxytocin tends to reduce behavioral and autonomic reactivity to stressful experiences, whereas vasopressin is associated with arousal and vigilance. " 61 Oxytocin is considered by psychologist Dacher Keltner 62 to be the biological underpinning of trust. It is released by touch, warm smiles, head tilts, and open-handed gestures.
Behavioral Sciences
During the past quarter-century of research, the dominant approach to understanding early socioemotional and personality development has been att achment theory. John Bowlby, a British medical doctor and psychoanalyst, defined and elaborated the concept of att achment. He postulated that human beings begin life with an inborn capacity that promotes att achment to their mother. 63 He viewed att achment seeking as instinctive social behavior with the biological function of maintaining proximity to a caregiver. Bowlby used his clinical observations of mother-child relationships to describe how these relationships become the means by which we bond to one another throughout life.
Mary Ainsworth, Bowlby's associate, expanded Bowlby's view of att achment seeking by recognizing that children need not only proximity to caregivers but also emotional access in order to form att achment bonds. She further described that att achment seeking varied in intensity with perceived danger but always functioned to prevent separation from and to gain emotional access to a caregiver. For the scientific investigation of att achment seeking, Ainsworth invented a videotaped procedure. 64 Th is laboratory procedure, called the Strange Situation Test, made it possible to classify particular qualities of the att achment relationship between a child (12 to 20 months of age-at the height of separation anxiety) and a caregiver. In the Strange Situation Test, both child and caregiver play in a room supplied with toys until a friendly stranger (the experimenter) joins them. Th e caregiver then leaves the room, returns aft er three minutes, and resumes playing with her child and the experimenter. Th en, both caregiver and experimenter leave. Aft er another three minutes, the caregiver returns, which ends the experiment. Later, researchers view the taped situation and code the caregiver-child interaction, classifying the child according to one of three att achment patt erns: secure att achment to his caregiver, insecureavoidant att achment, or insecure-resistant att achment.
A former student of Ainsworth, Mary Main, added a fourth category: disorganized/disoriented att achment. Some children studied in the Strange Situation Test were followed up to the age of 19. Th eir original att achment patt ern predicted subsequent behavior patt erns, especially patt erns of interpersonal relating with parents, teachers, and peers.
Interest then arose with regard to caregivers' att achment patt erns. To study caregivers, Main, together with Eric Hesse, developed the Adult Att achment Interview. Th is semistructured interview elicits a narrative of the adults' childhood memories of separations and losses, memories of illnesses, and memories of feelings such as feeling loved or unloved. 65 Main and Hesse use a highly structured system to rate various aspects of the autobiographical narrative so that an adult can be classified reliably into att achment patt erns. Th ese att achment patt erns both reflect how the adult bonded with his or her parents in the past and also predict how the adult will bond with his or her own children in the present or in the future, at least in contemporary Western culture. 66 Building on the scientific discoveries in the att achment literature, we are coming to understand how our human nervous system is organized through relationship. 67 Social att achment is a crucial motivator "of moral actions and . . . inextricably linked with moral evaluations and judgments . . . deeply influenced by social learning and by individual biological diff erences. " 68 Our neurobiology depends on intersubjective encounters-encounters where the right brain neural networks of people are communicating with each other. 69 
The Neuroscience of Intersubjectivity
Intersubjectivity-defined in the 1970s-is interpersonal communion. It is a "sharing of experiential content (e.g., feelings, perceptions, thoughts, and linguistic meaning) among a plurality of subjects." 70 Th ree layers of intersubjectivity-two occurring in human development before language and one occurring aft er language-have been distinguished by those working from a simulation perspective. 71 Primary intersubjectivity is direct resonance with another's expression of feelings in a reciprocal subjectto-subject contact. Th is dance-like proto-conversation can be seen from the first months of life. Indeed, it has been observed in an infant 42 minutes old. Th is is the expression of the innate tendency of all human beings to connect with another. It is our "deepest moral core. " 72 Secondary intersubjectivity occurs where an object is the focus of joint att ention and emotional referencing within the trusting relationship. It appears from about nine months of age. It is a "cooperative awareness" 73 of the world we share. Tertiary intersubjectivity-att ained in the second year of life-is symbolic conversation sharing goals and unspoken intentions with others. Other researchers from the perspective of Intentional Relations Th eory have identified a fourth level that is achieved in year four. Now children not only share minds, they understand minds. 74 Our neurobiology depends on these layers of intersubjective encounterseven primary and secondary intersubjectivity-where the right hemispheres of people (cortical and subcortical neural networks) are nonverbally communicating with each other. 75 Remember, the right hemisphere's communication is emotional and nonverbal (facial expression, prosody, gesture). Intersubjective communication is the process whereby the subjective experience of one person has an impact on the subjective experience of another, and vice versa. It is a reciprocal process of acting on each other physiologically that is experienced as emotions. In other words, it is detecting the emotions expressed nonverbally by another and reflecting them in mirroring activity of the perceiver's brain. 76 Educational psychologist Ann Cale Kruger calls this sharing of emotional states "communion. " She views communion as a uniquely human desire. 77 One of the newest studies of mother-infant intersubjective communication involves a series of near-infrared spectroscopy studies of 18 mothers and 15 infants averaging 11.7 months of age. Th e results indicate that neural processes in the right anterior orbitofrontal cortex play a role in regulating and encoding the aff ect in the social att achment system. 78 Th e results of this study 79 are consistent with a functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) study of 13 mothers who showed activation of their right orbitofrontal cortex during moments of maternal love triggered by viewing video clips, with no sound, of their own infant and other infants of approximately 16 months of age. 80 Another approach to understanding intersubjective communication is to study particular emotions. For example, pain and disgust have been studied. In studies of pain, seeing hands and feet in painful and nonpainful situations elicited fMRI activation in the anterior cingulate cortex and to a lesser degree in the anterior insula. Neural processes in these regions are known to play a significant role in the appraisal of one's own pain. 81 In another fMRI study, participants inhaled odorants producing a strong feeling of disgust. Th e same participants observed video clips showing the emotional facial expression of disgust. Observing such faces and feeling disgust activated the same sites in the anterior insula and to a lesser extent in the anterior cingulate cortex. 82 Th e results of these studies imply that we understand the emotions of others by a direct activation of the observed emotion in viscero-motor centers of our brain.
Von Economo neurons (VENs) are possible mediators of emotional knowledge. VENs are "a recently evolved cell type which may be involved in the fast intuitive assessment of complex situations. . . . Th e VENs emerge mainly aft er birth and increase in number until age 4 yrs [sic]. " 83 VENs are right lateralized frontal-insular cortex and anterior cingulate cells that relay a fast intuitive assessment of complex social situations to allow rapid adjustment of behavior in quickly changing social situations.
Not only do we understand the emotions of others intersubjectively, but we also understand the actions of others by a direct mapping of the visual representation of the observed action into a motor representation in our brain neural networks of the same action. Th e findings of various neuroimaging studies demonstrate that watching mouth, hand, and foot movements activates the same regions of the premotor cortex as performing those actions. 84 Mirror neurons in the premotor cortex are possible mediators of this coding for actions performed by the self and by another person. 85 
Embodied Simulation
Vitt orio Gallese 86 calls this direct bodily understanding "embodied simulation. " Embodied simulation is understanding another's actions directly without reflecting on them. It involves recognizing, anticipating, and interpreting the actions of another. It is accomplished when the observer represents the mental states of another by unconsciously matching those states with resonant states of his or her own. Gallese and colleagues state that Th e human brain is endowed with structures that are active both during the firstand third-person experience of actions and emotions. . . . Th us, the understanding of basic aspects of social cognition [intersubjective communication] depends on activation of neural structures normally involved in our own personally experienced actions or emotions. By means of this activation [embodied simulation], a bridge is created between others and ourselves. 87 Embodied simulation off ers a neuroscientific model to study self-other interactions in general 88 and morality in particular.
Shamay-Tsoory's Neural Model of Empathy
Dr. Simone Shamay-Tsoory, of the Department of Psychology at the University of Haifa, has proposed a neural model of empathy that involves embodied simulation (see fi gure 2). 89 Empathy is experienced when the neural networks mediating both cognitive empathy and also aff ective empathy are activated. Separate, albeit interacting, processes mediate these two components of empathy.
Embodied simulation underlies aff ective empathy-a function of neural networks located mostly in the right brain hemisphere. An example of aff ective empathy is "I feel his pain. " Neuroimaging studies indicate that the neural networks mediating embodied simulation reside in the following brain areas: the anterior cingulate cortex, the amygdala, the insula, and possibly the mirror neuron system in the inferior frontal gyrus.
Th eory of Mind (ToM) 90 underlies cognitive empathy-a function of neural networks located in the right and possibly the left brain hemispheres. Cognitive empathy has two components: a cognitive ToM (e.g., "I know that she is thinking about the book") and an aff ective ToM (e.g., "I know that he has been feeling miserable lately"). Th e role of the ventromedial prefrontal cortex within neural networks mediating aff ective ToM is well documented. 91 Recently, however, neural correlates of cognitive ToM have been identified. Th e findings of a repetitive transcranial magnetic stimulation study of cognitive and aff ective ToM tasks in healthy male subjects point to an important role of the right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex within the neural networks mediating cognitive ToM. 92 
ONE MESSAGE
Although the words mimesis and empathy did not exist in medieval theology, Scotus's thinking described both. His intellect/cognition included abstraction-what can be sensed about reality-and intuition-the simple knowing of reality. His intellect/cognition thus approximates cognitive empathy. Furthermore, Scotus's will/desire approximates aff ective empathy and mimesis. Empathy and mimesis are other-oriented. Th is is true of Scotus's two inclinations of the will toward good. It is obviously true for his aff ection for justice (aff ectio iustitiae), which is the inclination to love the good in others. It is less obviously true for his aff ection for the advantageous (aff ectio commodi), which is self-oriented in that the will is drawn to love what brings pleasure to the self. Th is conceptualization need not, however, preclude other-orientedness, because what brings pleasure to the self is seeing the other's pleasure in us. We are intersubjectively constituted.
What is also true of Scotus's two inclinations of the will is that both incline toward good. Sometimes justice (Scotus's aff ectio iustitiae) is thought to be disinterest. But, given what we now know neuroscientifically about mimesis and intersubjectivity, human beings cannot be disinterested. Th ey can be neurophysiologically disregulated, which will aff ect their morality. But they cannot be disconnected, and their will cannot be disinterested. 
FIGURE 2. SCHEMATIC: SHAMAY-TSOORY
At least a decade before neuroscience introduced ToM and two decades before neuroscience discovered mirror neurons, Girard articulated his mimetic theory. 93 "Early on, mimetic theory recognized human imitation as what was essentially human and the founding force that propelled proto-human beings to establish culture and primitive religions. " 94 Neuroscience now accounts for and supports mimesis. Behavioral science endorses the role of infant imitation in establishing att achment patt erns, in developing a capacity for empathy, and in creating a ToM. "We now know that newborns can imitate body movements at birth. Such imitation reveals an innate link between observed and executed acts, with implications for brain science, and also reveals a primordial connection between infant and caretaker, with implications for emotional development and intersubjectivity. " 95 With regard to brain science, neuroanatomy has discovered mirror neurons that perhaps mediate mimesis. With regard to emotional development and intersubjectivity, neurophysiology has proposed the Polyvagal Th eory to explain how states of calm and fear aff ect our perceptions (safety, danger, or life-threat), our att achment patt erns (secure, insecure, or disorganized), and our moral (valuing or judging others and us) discernments. 96 All three voices-those of Girard, Scotus, and neuroscience-endorse the intersubjectivity of mimesis. Scotus called it relationship: the relationship of will with intellect, the relationship of act with right reason. 97 Girard coined the neologism "interdividual" "to emphasize that human beings are never autonomous 'individuals.' We are constituted by the other, that is, by parents, authority figures, peers, rivals whom we internalize as models and who become the unconscious basis of our desires." 98 Neuroscience calls the intersubjectivity of mimesis embodied simulation-the way we represent the mental states of another by unconsciously matching those states with resonant states of our own. 99 
A Morality of Intersubjectivity
Scotus's vision of morality proposed a dynamic of bringing the diff erent aspects of our individual selves into harmony. If we superimpose Scotus's philosophical vision of morality on Shamay-Tsoory's neuroscientific model of empathy, we create a conceptual schematic of a morality of intersubjectivity that is consistent with Girard's anthropological theory of mimesis. In other words, Scotus's dynamic of establishing physical relationships based in love is what neuroscience now calls physical relationships based in security that produce a physiology of calm. Combining Scotus's dynamic with the neuroscientific model of empathy gives us a model for a morality of intersubjectivity, that is, a morality of mimesis. Th e integrated model from these three voices potentially lends an understanding of morality that can help us deal with a world that has become exceedingly complex and rationally fragmented (see fi gure 3).
Combining the two conceptualizations broadens Shamay-Tsoory's model of our neurologically based capacity for empathy to include Scotus's model of the will/desire as rational and helped toward action by the intellect/cognition. Th us, our capacity for empathy, via mimesis, via intersubjectivity mediated by mirror neurons, involves both intellect and free will. 100 Integrating Shamay-Tsoory's model with Scotus's model gives us a way of understanding what science (reason) and theology (faith) are telling us about morality. Both give us a vision of the whole. Th e scientific model endorses right action as the product of an integrated (right and left hemisphere) brain functioning. Th e theological model endorses right action as the product of bringing together love and rationality in freedom of the will to choose.
Girard's mimetic theory fits neatly into this conceptual model, particularly when he addresses freedom of the will. Th e fact that we constitute each other, he says, "does not mean that freedom of the will is not possible. Humankind as created in the image of God is not intended to be identical to the other or exist in slavish subservience to the other. However, since we learn first and primarily through mimesis, our freedom depends on being constituted by the other. " 101 Faith and reason need not be separated. Th ey should be understood, say Scotus and neuroscience, in order to produce right action. Our freedom, says Girard, depends on being constituted by the other. Taken together, these three voices-all endorsing our human intersubjectivity-call us to a morality of cocreating each other.
Because we are constituted by others, we can be constituted within secure att achments where we live in a physiology of calm and where we experience the greatest freedom of will to choose rightly. We can also, however, be constituted within insecure and disorganized att achments where we live in a physiology of anger or fear that influences our free will to choose wrongly.
Specifically, a morality of intersubjectivity calls us to a morality of co-creating each other in such a way that we all thrive. Postfoundationalist interdisciplinarian Andrea Hollingsworth calls this process a spirituality of compassion:
By spirituality of compassion I mean a way of relating to the sacred that cultivates empathic connectedness with others in their suff ering and promotes action to ease their distress. 102 Seeing the innocence of the other, as Girard proposes, frees us from the negative forces of mimesis.
CONCLUSION
One way of looking at the importance of mimesis for morality is to trace the acknowledgment of intersubjectivity in the three voices presented here.
Three Voices
Chronologically, Scotus speaks first. His belief in the intuitive knowledge of objects, linked with his emphasis on the will as a key factor in human morality, leads us to conclude with Emeritus Professor of Th eology Joseph A. Bracken, SJ, that Scotus was "groping aft er a more adequate worldview [than Aristotle's] grounded in the experience of individual subjectivity rather than in the strict logic of universal objectivity. " 103 Scotus's conceptualization of the capacity of human beings to establish harmony among our various inner aspects provides the means to create a compassionate physiological state. When we bring a compassionate physiological state into our intersubjective relationships, we promote this state in the world that surrounds us.
Girard's mimetic theory endorses mimesis as intrinsically good, 104 despite its potential negative consequences. Mimesis is opening out of oneself to others intersubjectively. It is desiring for the other what the other desires for her-or himself. It is a genuine valuing of diff erence. It is also desiring God. 105 Neuroscience, according to Andrew Meltzoff , says at least two things about mimesis. First, it endorses mimesis as essential for human development, by saying:
Imitation sets children on a trajectory for learning about the other's mind. Th e "likeme-ness" of others, first manifest in imitation, is a foundation for more mature forms of social cognition that depend on the felt equivalence between self and other. Th e Golden Rule, "Treat thy neighbor as thy self " at first occurs in action, through imitation. Without an imitative mind, we might not develop this moral mind. Imitation is the bud, and empathy and moral sentiments are the ripened fruit-born from years of interaction with other people already recognized to be "like me. " To the human infant, another person is not an alien, but a kindred spirit-not an "It" but an embryonic "Th ou. " 106 Second, neuroscience suggests how our human body mediates mimesis both neuroanatomically and neurophysiologically. Psychologist Scott R. Garrels summarizes how mimesis is a fundamental building block of human development:
Imitation based on mirrored neural activity and reciprocal interpersonal behavior is what guides and scaff olds human development from the beginning of life, significantly eff ecting the emergence and functioning of mental representation, communication and language, empathy, self-other diff erentiation, and a theory of mind. 107 
The Importance of Mimesis for Human Morality
Th e one message for human morality of all three voices is a call to take responsibility for our mimetic nature. We must take care about "what" we are imitating.
Scotus focuses on taking responsibility for our actions by acknowledging our deepest desires. Our intellect, according to Scotus, desires a face-to-face vision of God. Our will desires a beatific act of love. 108 We must encourage our will to choose what our intellect reasons rightly.
Girard calls us to identify with the other. He also acknowledges that there is a problem in doing so. Identification presupposes empathy, which can pull us into mimesis and violent reciprocity. His solution for taking responsibility for our violence is to imitate Christ in order to avoid the imitation of men. "Th e aspect of Christ that has to be imitated is his withdrawal. " 109 "He [Christ] withdraws at the very point when he could dominate. . . . To imitate Christ is to refuse to impose oneself as a model and to always eff ace oneself before others. " 110 Neuroscience, with its understanding of embodied simulation, endorses an age-old axiom: "Actions speak louder than words. " Th is is because when we have seen another's actions, we have done the action in mental representations in our brain neural networks. Embodied simulation calls us to take responsibility for our actions such that they create neural networks of compassion in the brains of those who see us.
Neuroscience also-like Scotus and Girard-cautions us that intersubjectivity is not always a guide for doing what is right. It is a guide for what is morally right, (1) when it comes out of a physiology of calm-of right hemisphere implicit emotions or left hemisphere explicit experiences of being loved-and (2) when it comes out of a physiology of danger when the danger is real-as in an encounter with a ratt lesnake. Intersubjectivity is not a guide for doing what is right when it comes out of a physiology of danger where the danger is driven by internalized fear-by right hemisphere implicit dread arising from earlier maltreatment and/or neglect. Th is guides us into immorality, into behaviors that are not good either for others or for us. 111 Taking responsibility for our mimetic nature challenges us to claim the potential to create an environment where empathy is strong. When empathy is strong, it is difficult to inflict harm because we see the other person as "someone like me" rather than some dehumanized "other. " Such an environment is one where it is easier to be good. As Bracken eloquently puts it, As I see it, only the presupposition of ongoing intersubjectivity between two or more individual self-constituting subjects of experience over an extended period of time allows for both particularity and universality, ongoing change and enduring order. Only thus can one explain first the emergence and then the consolidation of genuinely new forms of existence and activity at all levels of Nature in a lawlike manner. 112 Over 700 years ago, Scotus conceptualized morality as internal relationships within individual subjectivity-the relationship of our free will/desire choosing right action in agreement with the dictates of the intellect/cognition. Neuroscience now shows us that these internal relationships are the product of our intersubjective interactions mediated by our mirror neurons. Th e degree to which caregivers can keep intersubjective interactions in right relationship influences how their children's brains are wired so that as adults they can do what Scotus envisioned.
During the past 40-some years, Girard's insights about mimesis have described how our right brain hemispheric unconscious, nonverbal, bodilybased emotional knowing can and does usurp our cognitive capacities. Mimesis possibly engages the polyvagal neurophysiological system. When another's eyes light up, my eyes light up. When I stay with the delight in another's eyes, there is no competition. If I see the other take delight in someone or something else, my trust is undermined, and vengeance ensues unless the intersubjective rupture of trust is repaired. Whether or not trust is reestablished influences the type of att achment patt ern that we establish.
As both Scotus and Girard endorse, mimesis is intrinsically good. It is how we know we are, how we know we are in the world, and how we know we are known. But it is also our stumbling block when it pulls us into violence instead of compassion-when it pulls us into collusion against a scapegoat instead of into cooperation with the humanity of another. Our challenge is to understand our mimetic nature so that we can take responsibility for the violence we are prone to and live in the good we are inclined to. 79. In this near-infrared spectroscopy study (Minagawa-Kawai et al., "Prefrontal Activation Associated with Social Att achment"), mothers posed with a neutral expression and a smiling expression, which was video recorded from their neck up. Each infant's face was recorded when he/she was playing while caregivers or experimenters entertained the infants to elicit a smile. Video images were edited to obtain 20-to 30-second movie clips of the mother and infants, respectively, under both the neutral and the smiling conditions. Aft er the placement of near-infrared spectroscopy probes, mothers and infants took part in two sessions: own infant (mother) and unfamiliar infant (mother) conditions. Aft er the recording, mothers rated the emotional mood of their response to both their own and unfamiliar stimuli on a scale of zero-six (six = most loving). For the infant experiment, the infants were seated on their respective mothers' laps and were subjected to the stimuli. All experiments were DVD recorded to assess the participants' movement and att ention to the stimuli. For mothers, hemodynamic responses to the target movie stimuli against the baseline stimuli with a neutral expression were observed for own and unfamiliar conditions. For infants, a significant diff erence in hemodynamic changes between the smile and neutral stimuli was noted in the prefrontal cortex for only the own-mother condition.
